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RELIGION AND SEX IN THE YALE DORMS: A LEGISLATIVE




On October 15, 1997, four students filed suit against Yale University,
claiming that their constitutionally protected right to free exercise of relig-
ion had been violated.' Yale has a policy requiring first- and second-year
students to live in university housing.2  These four students, all Orthodox
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I See Plaintiffs' Complaint 60-67, Hack v. President of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d
183 (D. Conn. 1998) [hereinafter Complaint]. Although the media has referred to these stu-
dents as the "Yale Five," see infra note 4, only four students were plaintiffs in the lawsuit.
Initially, there was a fifth student who intended to join the others in filing. At the time, she
was engaged to be married a few months later. As discussed below, Yale allows an exemp-
tion to the residency requirement at issue in the lawsuit for married students. Thus, to exempt
herself, and avoid the necessity of joining the suit, she and her fiance had a civil marriage
ceremony performed. See Complaint, supra, at 57 (detailing the exit of the fifth student
from the suit). As a result, Yale recognized her marriage and exempted her from the dorm
requirement. After the civil ceremony, however, she had no intention to-and did not-live
in a "true marriage relationship" with her fiancd until after their religious marriage ceremony
months later. Id. Thus, when the story was first reported by the media, there were five poten-
tial plaintiffs. Even after the fifth litigant left the case, the name "the Yale Five" survived.
2 See Hack v. President of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186 (D. Conn. 1998)
("Yale's 'Dormitory Regulations' provide that '[a]ll freshmen and sophomores are required to
live on-campus, except freshmen who are married or who are over twenty-one years of
age."'). Before the 1995-96 academic year, this regulation did not apply to first- or second-
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Jews, claimed that dormitory life was incompatible with their strict religious
standards of modesty.3 Yale argued that living in the dormitories is "an in-
tegral component of a Yale education." 4 These students, however, did not
want to choose between the best education available to them and adherence
to their religious tenets. The two sides failed to reach a settlement, despite
extensive negotiations, and the students filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut.
5
In July, 1998, the court granted Yale's motion to dismiss on all counts.
6
The students' primary legal theory was that Yale was a state actor, and, by
failing to accommodate their religious needs, Yale violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment. Although such a claim would have
year students whose families lived in New Haven; nor did the policy apply to married students
or students over 21. See Complaint, supra note 1, 47. For the reasons that Yale changed its
residency policy, see infra note 58.
3 Orthodox Judaism thoroughly prescribes the details of daily life. Among the various
restrictions placed on its adherents, Orthodox Jews are forbidden from touching or being alone
with members of the opposite sex who are not spouses or close family members. Further-
more, and most relevant to the Hack lawsuit, it prohibits exposure to undressed or immodestly
dressed members of the opposite sex. See Complaint, supra note 1, 48 (outlining some as-
pects of the Orthodox code of sexual modesty); see also Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87 ("The
plaintiffs are Orthodox Jews 'whose religious beliefs and obligations regarding sexual mod-
esty forbid them to reside in the coeducational housing provided and mandated by Yale."'
(quoting Complaint, supra note 1, 1)). See generally Samuel G. Freedman, Yeshivish at
Yale, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (providing background on the facts
surrounding the Hack case).
4 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d
183 (D. Conn. 1998) [hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss"]; see also Complaint, supra note 1,
58 (alleging that Yale has insisted "that living in a Residential College [on-campus] is 'inte-
gral' to a Yale education"); William Glaberson, Five Orthodox Jews Spur Moral Debate Over
Housing Rules at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1997 (Metro Report), at 45 (quoting Yale offi-
cials as saying that residing on-campus is a "'defining requirement' of a Yale education").
5 See Susanne Sachsman, Orthodox Students File Lawsuit, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16,
1997, at I (reporting that prior to the filing of the lawsuit, Yale negotiated extensively and
made numerous offers of accommodations); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text
(describing the negotiations between Yale and the students).
6 See Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (dismissing the plaintiffs' multiple claims).
7 The First Amendment bars Congress from making any law "respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra
note 16 (explaining the application of the First Amendment to state actors by the incorpora-
tion doctrine).
In addition to the Free Exercise Clause violations, the plaintiffs in this case alleged in-
fringements of their constitutionally protected rights to privacy and equal protection. See
Complaint, supra note 1, 4 (claiming that Yale has a legal obligation to "avoid arbitrary
unequal treatment... and invasions of constitutionally protected privacy rights"). The stu-
dents also pursued a number of statutory and common law claims. See id. Because this
Comment's legislative proposal addresses the need to regulate religious accommodations, the
constitutional analysis will be primarily limited to the Free Exercise Clause. See infra Part I
(discussing the constitutional right to religious accommodations under the First Amendment);
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merit if Yale were a state university, the court, confirming the predictions of
legal commentators, rejected the argument that Yale is a state actor.
8
It was necessary for the students to rely on such a far-fetched legal the-
ory because few of the federal anti-discrimination statutes provide a remedy
for their claim.9 Indeed, the only civil rights statute under which the stu-
dents advanced a claim was the Fair Housing Act, a claim which also was
dismissed by the court.
10
This Comment argues for federal legislation requiring reasonable re-
ligious accommodations by private universities. This argument presupposes
two major premises. First, modem society places an ever-increasing value
on higher education. Today, a degree from an institution of higher learning
is a prerequisite for almost any individual with professional aspirations.
11
Second, America has seen a religious awakening of sorts over the past few
years.' 2 The role of faith in our lives has been cast into the limelight. This
trend can be seen both on Capitol Hill, where Congress has reaffirmed its
commitment to religious freedom, and in the fact that many individuals, es-
pecially professionals and students, are rediscovering religion in their daily
routines.
13
Our legal system already recognizes that religious beliefs should not
serve as an impediment to the realization of professional goals. To that end,
see also infra notes 78, 96 (discussing the scope of the analysis with regard to the statutory
claims advanced). In discussing the scope of its legislative proposal, this Comment also will
address certain Establishment Clause issues. See infra Part III (examining Establishment
Clause case law to determine the permissible scope of legislation requiring religious accom-
modations).
8 See Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (holding that Yale is not a state actor). This result con-
firms the thoughts of several commentators who previously had ventured guesses as to what
the court would hold. See, e.g., Sachsman, supra note 5 (quoting Columbia law professor Mi-
chael Doff as saying that the assertion that Yale is a state actor is "absurd" and "ridiculous"
and noting that Harvard law professor Kent Greenwalt echoed that opinion). But cf John
Cloud, Ivy League Gomorrah?, TIME, Sept. 22, 1997, at 70; Stuart Vincent, Down on the
Dorm, N.Y. NEWsDAY, Sept. 24, 1997, at A6 (reporting that prominent attorney and Harvard
law professor Alan Dershowitz has "taken up [the students'] cause"). Nonetheless, the stu-
dents' attorneys recently reported that they would appeal the decision. See Housing Suit Sent
Packing, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 1998, at 17.
9 See infra Part II.A (detailing how various civil rights statutes do not provide legal re-
course for these students).
10 See Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 193; see also infra Part II.A (discussing the court's treat-
ment of the Yale Five's Fair Housing Act claim).
11 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the similarities between religious discrimination in
higher education and religious discrimination in employment).
12 See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (citing various indications of a religious
revival in America).
13 See generally infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the growing public commitment to religion
and congressional interest in ensuring religious freedom).
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Congress enacted Title VII, an anti-discrimination law prohibiting employ-
ers from punishing employees because of their religious observances. 14 The
current civil rights statutes, however, have not kept pace with either soci-
ety's relatively newfound emphasis on higher education or its religious re-
vitalization. As citizens rekindle their interest in religion, the existing laws
protecting the employee remain weak and ineffective, and there is no pro-
tection for the religious student enrolled in a private university. Individuals
in college and graduate school, in pursuit of professional success, should be
afforded at least the same protection from religious discrimination as job
applicants and employees. Thus, in response to these societal trends, Con-
gress should mandate that private universities make reasonable religious ac-
commodations for their students.
In Part I, this Comment analyzes the obligation of a state-actor univer-
sity to accommodate religious requests made by its students. This is an ap-
propriate starting point, given the recent decision in a similar case involving
religious accommodations and residency requirements at the University of
Nebraska, a state actor. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in the Hack case ad-
vanced the legal theory that Yale is a state actor. Part I concludes that had
the court deemed Yale a state actor, the school would have a duty to make
reasonable religious accommodations. Part II considers the current federal
anti-discrimination and civil rights statutes and concludes that there is pres-
ently no statutory remedy available to private university students whose re-
ligious observances fall beyond the guarantees of constitutional protection.
Part II then presents the normative and policy arguments that support the
proposition that Congress should create a cause of action to give redress to
students who require reasonable religious accommodations. Part III will
address ways in which the proposed legislation could violate the Establish-
ment Clause, thereby limiting the scope of the proposal. Finally, in Part IV,
this Comment suggests the affirmative constitutional basis for, and drafts
the language of, the proposed legislation which imposes a duty to accom-
modate on private universities.
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2 (1994).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS
A. The Precedents: Rader v. Johnston and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah
A fundamental principle regarding the Bill of Rights is that it only
regulates governmental actors.15 Thus, because Yale is a privately-operated,
not a state-controlled, university, one would expect that it should not be
bound by the restrictions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 6 The heart of the Yale Five's case against the school, however, was
found in a series of constitutional claims that assumed that Yale is a state
actor.' 7 Although contrary to the district court's conclusion, if we do as-
sume that Yale is a state actor,18 the most appropriate starting point for any
analysis would be the constitutional requirements under the First Amend-
ment to provide religious accommodations. 19 The case that most recently
applied First Amendment law to the question of universities' obligation to
provide religious accommodations is Rader v. Johnston.20 Rader is not only
15 Chief Justice Marshall observed long ago that the Bill of Rights speaks to Congress
and not the state governments. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 153, 159, 7 Pet.
242, 250 (1833) (noting that the Bill of Rights "contain[s] no expression indicating an inten-
tion to apply them to state govemments"). In fact, the language of the First Amendment sup-
ports this: "Congress shall pass .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Even after
the Court held that many of the Bill of Rights prohibitions are imposed on the states, see
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), it is clear that these prohibitions place
no restrictions on the activity of private citizens.
16 The First Amendment and certain other provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable
to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
303-04 (applying the First Amendment to the states by the incorporation doctrine). The
Fourteenth Amendment is explicitly applicable to the States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
("No State shall .... ") (emphasis added).
17 See supra note 7 (discussing the additional claims that the Yale Five made against the
university).
is This Comment later discusses the court's rejection of this premise. See infra Part I.C
(analyzing the application of the factors used in Lebron v. National RP. Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374 (1995), to the Yale Five case).
19 This analysis is also relevant in supporting the normative arguments underlying this
Comment's legislative proposal. If the Constitution imposes on state actors a duty to accom-
modate, then Congress should mandate a parallel, statutory duty of private individuals. See
infra notes 79, 97 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between the Constitu-
tion's protections against discrimination and the federal civil rights statutes). Thus, despite
the Hack court's decision that Yale is not a state actor, the constitutional analysis still remains
important from a policy perspective. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, God and Man in the Yale Dormito-
ries, 84 VA. L. REV. 843, 845 & n.12 (1998) (presenting the argument that "private universi-
ties ought to adopt First Amendment principles" in accommodating students' religious re-
quests).
20 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
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the most recent case, but also the most directly on point to the case of the
Yale Five, as it, too, discusses university residency requirements.
Douglas Rader, a devout Christian and incoming first-year student to
the University of Nebraska at Kearney ("UNK"), requested permission to
live off-campus. 21 He asserted that the offensive and wild behavior that is
typical of dormitories would drastically interfere with his religious life-
style.22  Rader needed UNK's permission to move off-campus because
UNK, like Yale, has a parietal rule requiring first- and second-year students
to live on-campus. UNK provided a number of reasons for this rule, in-
cluding the positive effects of promoting diversity and tolerance among the
student body, as well as enhancing student academic performance. 23 De-
spite these rationales, however, UNK had been less than rigorous in en-
forcing this policy: it waived the residency requirement in response to nu-
merous claims of "exceptional circumstances," in addition to a number of
standard exemptions. 24
Rader argued that the state university violated his rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by applying the parietal rule to him
in a discriminatory fashion.25 In assessing Rader's claim, the court applied
the test outlined in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
26
which addresses state action that curtails religious freedom.2 7 In Church of
Lukumi, the defendant city passed several ordinances designed to prevent
the members of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye from performing rit-
ual animal sacrifices.28 These ordinances were riddled with exceptions, al-
lowing the slaughter of animals for almost any purpose other than ritual sac-
29rifice. In determining the constitutionality of this law, the Court's analysis
initially turned on whether the state law was (1) neutral and (2) of general
applicability. 30 If the statute or rule did not conform to either one of these
requirements, the Court required, in order for the statute to pass Constitu-
21 The facts here are based on the district court's account. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at
1543-49 (detailing Rader's request and UINK's policy on first-year housing).
22 See id. at 1544-45.
23 See id. at 1548, 1558 n. 16; cf infra notes 156-58 (discussing UNK's and Yale's re-
luctance to admit to financial motivations underlying their respective parietal rules).
24 Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1546-47. These standard exceptions included exemptions for
married students and students over the age of2l. See id.
25 See id. at 1543; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 508 U.S. 520, 545 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance clearly designed to prohibit a
certain religious group from performing ritual animal sacrifices was unconstitutional).
27 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1551 (requiring that restrictions on religion be both neutral
and generally applicable).
8 See Church ofLukumi, 508 U.S. at 527-28.
29 See id. at 535-38.
30 See id. at 531-32.
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tional muster, that the statute (1) fulfill a compelling state interest and (2) be
narrowly tailored to that objective.31 Applying that test to Rader's situation,
the district court concluded that UNK violated the First Amendment by
forcing Rader to live in the dormitories.
3 2
B. Applying the Rader and Church of Lukumi Analyses to the Yale Case
The First Amendment claim that Rader advanced was particularly
strong because of several factors specific to his case.33 This is reflected in
the relative ease with which the court in Rader concluded that the UNK rule
was unconstitutional.34 In the Yale case, however, and a hypothetical case
which this Comment will develop for purposes of discussion, a First
Amendment claim would not be as strong.35 Even under the facts of the
31 See id. at 532, 544-46 (finding that the city ordinances were underinclusive, since they
applied only to religious animal sacrifices, and that they were not narrowly tailored to the
compelling governmental interest of preventing cruelty to animals and preserving the public
health).
32 Specifically, the district court found that the great number of exceptions allowed by
UNK rendered the rule neither neutral nor generally applicable. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at
1553-56 (noting that UNK allowed medical, age, and marital status exceptions, but did not
allow religious exceptions). The Rader court further concluded that the granting of these ex-
ceptions undercut UNK's argument that the parietal rule served a compelling state interest. If
the interest was legitimately compelling, UNK would not have allowed such a great number
of exemptions. Finally, the court provided many examples that showed how the implementa-
tion of the rule by UNK was both under- and over-inclusive in relation to its stated objectives.
For example, the court did not understand how exempting students whose parents lived in the
vicinity of UNK furthered the objectives of the parietal rule. If the purpose of the rule was to
increase diversity, then those students who resided nearby also should have been forced to live
in university housing. As a result, the court easily concluded that the rule was not narrowly
tailored. See id. at 1556-58; see also infra Part I.B (applying the Church of Lukumi compel-
ling-state-interest requirement to the Yale Five case).
33 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1555; see also supra note 32.
34 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553-56; see also supra note 32 (discussing how the un-
usual amount of exceptions to LINK's housing rule allowed the court to conclude that the rule
neither served a compelling state interest nor was narrowly tailored).
35 This Comment assumes the facts of the Yale situation to be roughly the same as that of
a hypothetical case. It is true that all universities have different policies and respond differ-
ently to students' requests. Yale's policy, however, as well as its response to the requests,
have been fairly reasonable and administered with relative uniformity (as opposed to that of
UNK). See infra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that Yale has strictly enforced the
dorm requirement); infra note 62 (stating that Yale negotiated with the students before reach-
ing an impasse). Because Yale has been consistent and reasonable, it serves as a good "hy-
pothetical" model.
This Comment also generally limits its analysis to the parietal rule question. It recognizes
that requests for religious accommodations can potentially come in all different forms. Of the
many ways that university policies could interfere with a student's religious life, however,
forcing a student to reside in an objectionable living situation is at the more extreme end of
the spectrum. The anti-discrimination laws should at least support a student's request to live
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Yale case, however, it still appears that a state-actor university would have a
duty to make religious accommodations.
1. Neutrality and General Applicability
In Rader, UNK gave exemptions to over one-third of the incoming first-
year students for a variety of social and economic reasons.36 Since the Uni-
versity accommodated the needs of a large portion of its student population,
but not Rader's religious request, the court easily concluded that the Univer-
sity was not administering its rule neutrally. 37 Moreover, the existence of
"standard" exemptions38 showed that the rule was not generally applica-
ble.39 Thus, in order for UNK's parietal rule to pass constitutional muster,
UNK would have had to show a compelling state interest to deny Rader's
request.
40
Unlike Rader, Yale's rule was not only facially neutral, but also was
implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.4 1 The dorm requirement at
Yale was faithfully enforced, with only the rarest of exceptions granted.
42
Yale's rule, however, still arguably could be considered not neutral or not
in a nonoffensive setting. Thus, it is appropriate to generally base the discussion of the neces-
sity to mandate religious accommodations on the specific facts of the Yale case. See also in-
fra note 111 (citing reports that requests similar to those put forth by Rader and the Yale Five
are becoming more commonplace on college campuses).
36 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1547 n.14 (noting that only 1600 of the 2500 first-year stu-
dents lived on-campus).
37 See id. at 1554-55 (arguing that while the residency policy "as written is certainly neu-
tral on its face and in its purpose," the court could not "conclude that the rule is being en-
forced in a neutral manner" when "administrators refuse to consider an entire class of indi-
viduals ... who desire to live [off-campus] based upon their faith, for exceptions to a policy
that some thirty-six percent of freshmen students routinely receive"). See generally Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a facially neutral statute can violate the Equal
Protection Clause if it is administered in a discriminatory fashion).
38 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1546-47 (describing UNK's residency rule exceptions).
39 See id. (finding that the policy is not generally applicable where there are many excep-
tions allowed, but not one for religious beliefs).
40 See id. at 1556-58 (conducting an analysis of the compelling interests that UNK's pol-
icy was designed to foster); see also supra note 32 (discussing the Rader court's opinion that
the large number of exceptions undercut the University's compelling-state-interest argument).
41 For purposes of discussion, the same applies to my hypothetical case. See supra note
35 (explaining why the Yale fact scenario is appropriate for use as a hypothetical case).
42 As opposed to Rader, where the plaintiff was easily able to point to numerous excep-
tions to UNK's parietal rule, the Yale Five could not. See Complaint, supra note 1, 64, 71
(alleging only that Yale granted the standard exemptions to students who were married or over
21 years of age); see also Sachsman, supra note 5 (quoting Yale officials as saying that ac-
commodating students' requests does not mean "waiving the housing policy"); Vincent, supra
note 8 (reporting that the students were aware that "Yale required all freshmen and sopho-
mores to live on campus").
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generally applicable. Although Yale enforced the rule for the overwhelm-
ing majority of students, there were still a number of exceptions granted to
married students and students over the age of twenty-one.43 The Church of
Lukumi Court stated that where "individualized exemptions from a general
requirement are available, the government 'may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of "religious hardship" without compelling reason."'
4
Even if a valid argument could have been advanced that Yale's parietal
rule was neutral, 45 there are other considerations that would have circum-
vented the need for the neutrality and general applicability analysis. The
Rader court, for example, identified one scenario in which even a neutral
law must meet the compelling interest test.46 That scenario was based on an
observation of the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith.47 The
Court noted that if state action infringes upon more than one constitutional
right, the law must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, re-
gardless of its neutrality or general applicability.48 In the Yale case, the
right to free exercise of religion was not the only potential constitutional
violation. The students also alleged that their rights to equal protection and
privacy had been violated.n9 Thus, these other constitutional claims may
have triggered the compelling interest standard, even if the residency rule
was applied neutrally.
50
43 See Complaint, supra note 1 64, 71 (arguing that the exemptions granted by Yale to
married students, students over age 21, and all juniors and seniors render the rule neither neu-
tral nor generally applicable). The plaintiffs also argued that there was no rational basis to
impose the dorm requirement on first- and second-year students, while exempting juniors and
seniors. Therefore, they asserted, the rule also violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
73-74.
44 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993)
(quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)); see also Rader, 924 F. Supp.
at 1552 n.23 (listing several instances where the Supreme Court has held that specific excep-
tions to a general rule can trigger strict scrutiny, if exemptions are not also granted for relig-
ious reasons).
45 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 12-14 (making the same argument that Yale's
parietal rule was neutral).
46 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1550-51 n.21 (discussing a scenario in which some courts
have applied strict scrutiny despite a law's neutrality and general applicability).
47 494 U.S. at 872.
48 See id. at 881-82 (asserting that "the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action" not only when the Free Exercise
Clause is implicated, but when other constitutional protections are implicated as well, and
providing examples of such cases).
49 See supra note 7.
50 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1550-51 n.21. The Rader court explained that it did not
address any alternative constitutional claims, though viable, because they were not presented
by the plaintiff. See id. at 1543 n.2. In the Yale case, however, the plaintiffs alleged a number
of constitutional violations other than the free exercise claim. See supra note 7 (listing the
students' allegations of breaches of their rights to privacy and equal protection).
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2. Narrowly Tailored to a Compelling Interest
The Yale rule would fail the first prong of the Supreme Court's test ei-
ther because the rule is not neutral, or because other constitutional rights are
violated.51 Therefore, the parietal rule at issue must comply with the second
prong: it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in
order to survive a constitutional attack.52 In Rader, the court cited Church
of Lukumi for the proposition that a "law cannot be regarded as protecting
an interest 'of the highest order' .... when it leaves appreciable damage to
that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. ' 53  Thus, the sheer number of
exceptions to the residency requirement granted by the UNK administration
led the court to decide that living on-campus could not be a compelling in-
terest.54 In the Yale case, however, there were far fewer exemptions. This
difference may be enough to convince a court that Yale's parietal rule fur-
thered the compelling state interest of promoting diversity among the stu-
The discussion of multiple constitutional claims is relevant here despite this Comment's
limited focus on the Free Exercise Clause. In situations where university students request re-
ligious accommodations, especially when asking for special living arrangements, these other
constitutional rights (most often, the right to privacy) are frequently implicated. Thus, plain-
tiffs in such cases will often be able to rely on other constitutional claims to bolster their free
exercise claims.
It should be noted that some lower courts have been hesitant to require state action to
meet the compelling interest test simply because of a "hybrid," multiple-constitutional claim.
In Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993), the
court rejected the proposition that "a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if
it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the [F]ree Exercise Clause if it
did not implicate other constitutional rights." Id. at 180. The Sixth Circuit thus declined to
accept the hybrid claim theory until the Supreme Court expressly adopts the theory in a hold-
ing. (The Kissinger court maintained that the passage in Smith on which the hybrid theory is
based is merely dicta.) See id. Other courts, however, such as the district court in Rader,
have embraced the hybrid claim. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174
(Wash. 1992) (accepting the hybrid claim theory to require a showing of a compelling state
interest). Thus, one could safely assume that the students would prevail either with the strong
argument that the parietal rule at issue is not neutral or generally applicable, or they could
convince the court to accept the hybrid claim theory.
51 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the constitutional analysis under the first prong of the
Court's test).
52 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-33
(1993) (stating that a law failing to satisfy the neutrality and general applicability require-
ments must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest); see also Smith, 494 U.S.
at 881-82 (noting that when more than one constitutional right is implicated, even a neutral
and Benerally applicable law may have to undergo this more stringent analysis).
Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1557 (quoting Church ofLuklumi, 508 U.S. at 547).
54 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the court's opinion that the
large number of exceptions undercut the University's argument that there was a compelling
interest in living on-campus).
55 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 14 n.16 (distinguishing the Yale case from
Rader on -the reasoning that UNK "granted many exceptions to the [residency requirement]").
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dent body. Indeed, Yale asserted the centrality of dorm life to the "Yale ex-
perience" and subsequently implemented policies furthering these objec-
tives.56
Nevertheless, assuming Yale is a state actor, there was another reason
to believe that Yale's rule may not have been serving a compelling interest:
the Yale administration had readily admitted that it would not enforce its
own parietal rule. As long as the students paid the required fee for room
and board, the University would not check if the students were actually liv-
ing in the dorm and benefiting from the "Yale experience." 57 Just as the
multiple exemptions weakened UNK's assertion of the parietal rule's im-
portance, this professed lack of enforcement on Yale's part undercut its po-
sition that dorm life is central to the Yale education.58
Moreover, even if Yale could have proven that its rule is motivated by a
compelling interest, the rule must also have been narrowly tailored to fur-
ther that objective.59 Yale's stated reason for its residency requirement was
to encourage diversity on its campus. The plaintiffs did not argue with
this objective; rather, it was the exposure to the sexual promiscuity of dor-
mitory life that they found offensive. 61 In the course of negotiations be-
56 See supra note 4 (noting that University officials stressed that living on-campus is in-
tegral to the Yale experience).
57 See Cloud, supra note 8 (noting that Yale has allowed Orthodox students in the past to
live off-campus, provided that they pay the fee and that recounting Yale also offered this op-
tion to the students in the current case).
58 Yet another factor could undermine the credibility of Yale's claim that the dorm re-
quirement serves a compelling interest. The parietal rule made an exception up until two
years ago for those students whose families resided in New Haven. See supra note 2. Some
have cynically suggested that Yale's change in policy was not the result of a rethinking of
fundamental educational values. Rather, Yale implemented the new rule for financial reasons
because a great number of upperclassmen were moving off-campus. See Jonathan Rabinovitz,
Yale Degree, Minus the Fabled Dorms, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1995, at BI (reporting that hun-
dreds of students are fleeing the dorms and instead choosing to live on their own in New Ha-
ven).
Ultimately, however, it may not matter whether or not Yale had this less-than-noble mo-
tive for changing its policy. In Rader, the court reserved judgment regarding whether the pa-
rietal rule could further a compelling interest even if its basis was financial. See Rader, 924 F.
Supp. at 1557 (stating that UNK's many interests, including an "interest in ensuring the finan-
cial stability of its residence hall programs," are "legitimate and possibly even important state
interests"). Thus, even if the court had found that the change in Yale's residency require-
ments was motivated by financial considerations, this would not have been necessarily fatal to
Yale's contention that the rule serves a compelling interest.
59 See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1557 ("'[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest
of the highest order .... [sic] when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital in-
terest unprohibited."' (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
60 See supra note 4 (noting the importance of the "Yale experience" in the dormitories).
61 See Hack v. President of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186-87 (D. Conn. 1998)
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tween the students and Yale, the University offered single-sex rooms on
single-sex floors. The students ultimately rejected this offer because Yale
refused to enforce a policy prohibiting visitors of the opposite sex.62 Yale
did not claim that allowing students to bring overnight visitors of the oppo-
site sex is a compelling state interest. The University's only concern was
exposing its students to the diversity of its community. 63 Thus, the parietal
rule is unconstitutional because of Yale's failure to implement the dorm re-
quirement in a manner which minimized unnecessary infringement on these
students' First Amendment rights.
C. Private Universities Are Not State Actors
In light of the analysis above, an aggrieved student could successfully
litigate a complaint that charged a lack of religious accommodations by a
university if the constitutional standards apply to the university. The
Court's extensive test in Church of Lukumi is well-designed to prevent cur-
tailments of religious freedom in violation of the First Amendment. Thus, a
university that can be classified as a state actor could be held accountable
for the form of religious intolerance alleged in the Yale case.
Even before the district court ruled that Yale was not a state actor,
Yale's status as a state actor was questionable at best. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment-and thus, the Bill of Rights-binds only state actors, pri-
vately owned institutions are not generally within its reach.64 The Court has
recognized some limited exceptions to this rule, such as when the private
action can be attributed to the State.65 The plaintiffs in the Yale case, how-
ever, did not suggest that Yale serves a public function, as it is a privately
(noting that the plaintiffs' religious beliefs prohibited them from living in the coeducational
housing); see also supra note 3 (discussing the restrictions imposed by Orthodox Judaism re-
garding contact between members of the opposite sex).
62 See Morning Edition: Yale Religious Controversy (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 24,
1997) [hereinafter Morning Edition] (reporting that Yale offered the students single-sex floors
and bathrooms, but that Yale claimed it "cannot get into the business of policing dormitories
to make sure that no men ever show up to visit a female area or vice versa"); see also Jona-
than Rosenblum, Free the Yale Five, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 21, 1997, at 9 (noting that Yale
"flatly rejected the [students'] suggestion that they be placed with other students who have
voluntarily committed to refraining from sex in the dorms").
63 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 2 (asserting that "living on campus is an inte-
gral component of a Yale education").
64 See supra notes 15-16 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the Bill
of Rights, apply only to state actors).
See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (noting that if the State "exer-
cised coercive power" or provided "significant encouragement," the State would be deemed
responsible for the actions of a "private decision"); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (adopting a "sufficiently close nexus" test to determine whether private
business action should be considered state action).
[147:205
RELIGION AND SEXIN THE YALE DORMS
owned and operated university. 66 Nor did they propose that "a sufficiently
close nexus between the State" 67 and Yale's action existed, a nexus that
might cause the State to be responsible for68 Yale's policies discriminating
against religion.
Instead, the students in the Yale case relied exclusively on the Court's
recent decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,6 9 and ar-
gued that Yale was a direct agent of the State of Connecticut. In Lebron,
the Court held that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak")
is a state actor with regard to rights protected by the Constitution, despite
being a privately owned, for-profit organization. The Court developed a
three-pronged test to identify a state actor: the corporation must be created
by a special act of Congress; the corporation must be designed to carry out
government objectives; and the government must retain the right to choose
the majority of the board of the corporation.7' Thus, although Amtrak is
privately owned in name, it is effectively an "agency or instrumentality" of
the government. In Hack, the plaintiffs argued that Yale's close ties with
the State of Connecticut rendered Yale an instrumentality of the State.
72
They cited the state constitution which charters the University and mandates
66 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that the "plaintiffs ... refrain from
making an alternative [traditional] claim for state action under the pre-Lebron analysis" (citing
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995))); infra notes 69-74 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Lebron doctrine). To be cautious, however, Yale cited nu-
merous cases in its motion supporting the proposition that private universities are not state
actors, under the traditional tests of state action. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 10-
11. The court, following Yale's lead, engaged in an analysis of the issue as well, even though
the students did not argue on that ground. See Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 187-92 (analyzing
whether Yale's conduct qualifies as state action).
The primary case cited by Yale and discussed by the court supporting this position is
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). See Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 187, 190-92. In
Kohn, the Supreme Court held that a private school that received 90 to 99% of its budget from
public funding was still not a state actor. See 457 U.S. at 840-41. Because the government
regulators took little interest in and prompted little activity concerning the school's policies,
its decisions could not be attributed to the state. See id. at 841. Similarly, Yale argued and
the Hack court concluded that Yale is not a state actor, as there was no allegation that "the
State of Connecticut, either through a regulation or policy, exercised coercive power or sig-
nificantly encouraged Yale to adopt its housing policy." Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
67 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
68 See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
69 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
70 See id. at 400 (holding that the close connection between Amtrak and the government
makes Amtrak "part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment").
71 See id. (outlining the three-part test that the Court applied to determine whether a pri-
vate corporation is a state actor for First Amendment purposes).
72 See Complaint, supra note 1, 66-67 (alleging that the historically close relationship
between Yale and the State of Connecticut renders Yale's refusal to provide religious exemp-
tions state action).
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that the Governor and Lieutenant Governor sit on the governing body of
Yale.73
Nevertheless, the district court followed the lead of several lower
courts, which have read the Lebron decision extremely narrowly. Specifi-
cally, those courts declared that even if the State wields a good deal of in-
fluence in an organization, Lebron does not control unless a majority of the
board is appointed by the State.74 In response to this contention, the plain-
tiffs argued that Connecticut's influence on Yale is far greater than simply
assigning two members to the University's governing body. 75 The court,
however, was not persuaded and preferred a more technical application of
Lebron, holding that because the State of Connecticut does not select a ma-
jority of the Yale board, the third prong of the Lebron test was not met. As
76a result, the Supreme Court's decision did not control in this case.
This analysis yields an even more important result in a hypothetical
case. If Yale, whose relationship with the State of Connecticut predates the
American Revolution by three-quarters of a century, is not a state actor un-
der a technical application of Lebron, then neither is any other private uni-
versity.77 The religious student, searching for recourse after requests for
73 See id. The students also detailed at length many other facets of a three-hundred-year
history tying together the State of Connecticut and Yale. See id. 18-45.
4 See, e.g., Hall v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir.) (holding
that the Red Cross is not a state actor because the government can choose only 8 of its 50
board members), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 516 (1996); American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1407-08 (9th Cir.) (noting that even when
an institution is chartered by Congress, it is not a state actor when the President appoints only
5 of 18 board members) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 58 (1996); Glendora v. Cablevision Sys.
Corp., 893 F. Supp. 264, 270 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing its case from Lebron be-
cause, in its case, the government had no authority to appoint board members).
75 The plaintiffs pointed to the significance of the two board members that the State ap-
points-the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. See Complaint, supra note 1, 66. This ar-
gument was questioned on the grounds that the board membership of these state officers was a
mere formality. See Sachsman, supra note 5 (reporting that Yale's legal counsel contended
that the Governor's position was merely honorary).
76 Hack v. President of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D. Conn. 1998) (noting
that because the Yale board has 19 members, the 2 members chosen by the State-the Gover-
nor and Lieutenant Governor-are not a majority; therefore, Lebron does not apply).
77 For this reason, the specific result in the Yale case is not of absolute importance. Even
if the plaintiffs on an appeal could convince a court that factors such as Yale's 300-year his-
tory with the State of Connecticut make the University a state actor, almost no other private
universities are chartered by their state constitutions. It is, thus, very unlikely that students
from other private universities could win on constitutional claims. Although its analysis was
pre-Lebron (and thus not entirely compelling), one court has already rejected such an argu-
ment in connection with Yale's fiercest competitor. See Rice v. President of Harvard College,
663 F.2d 336, 337-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that the historical connection between Harvard
and the State of Massachusetts is not sufficient to give the University status as a state actor).
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reasonable accommodations have been refused, would have to look beyond
the protections afforded directly by the Constitution.
II. THE FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES AND RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS
With no basis for constitutional claims, religious students must turn to
the federal civil rights statutes for relief.78 Following the Constitution's
model outlawing state discrimination, the civil rights statutes were designed
to protect the general population from private acts of discrimination. 79 Al-
though existing civil rights statutes govern discrimination in the context of
education, these laws deal only with issues of race and gender.80 As a re-
78 As noted above, the Hack plaintiffs advanced claims on a number of statutory grounds.
See Complaint, supra note 1, 5, 7; supra note 7 (noting that the Yale Five advanced a num-
ber of statutory claims); see also infra note 96 (noting that the students advanced claims under
the Fair Housing and Sherman Antitrust Acts). For the reasons noted below, this Comment
will not address the Sherman Antitrust claims.
Interestingly, none of these alternative legal theories are based on the civil rights statutes
except the dismissed fair housing claim. Furthermore, in Rader v. Johnston, there were no
civil rights claims presented other than a dismissed claim under the now unconstitutional Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act (the "RFRA"). See 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 n.2 (D. Neb.
1996) (noting a previous grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff under RFRA, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), declared unconstitutional in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2172 (1997)). The fact that the plaintiffs in the two most prominent cases on point
failed to even make out a colorable claim based on the civil rights laws further supports the
proposition that there is, indeed, no statutory remedy under current federal anti-discrimination
laws. See inffra Part II.A (arguing that the current civil rights laws do not provide sufficient
protection); see also Glaberson, supra note 4, at 49 (reporting that federal civil rights laws do
not address the religious discrimination faced by the Hack plaintiffs).
79 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (stating that
the purpose of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to "halt federal finding of entities
that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution"); United
States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 151 (D.S.C. 1969) (noting that the purpose of Ti-
tles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act is to "eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and hu-
miliation of racial discrimination"); see also infra notes 101, 136 (explaining the purposes of
Title VII). Thus, if the only weak link in the students' constitutional claims was that Yale was
not a state actor, there is good reason to create protection under a new civil rights statute. See
supra note 19 (noting the bases of policy arguments for the creation of a new statute mandat-
ing reasonable religious accommodations).
80 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person ... shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in... or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program... receiving Federal financial assistance."); id. § 2000d-4a (defining the
term "program" under § 2000d to include colleges, universities, and other educational institu-
tions); Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (noting
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, part of the civil rights statutes, applies only to racial discrimination);
see also infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has stated
that both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act ban racial discrimination in
private, nonsectarian schools that would otherwise accept any qualified applicant). Although
it is not regulated in the group of statutes that are formally known as "civil rights statutes,"
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sult, the students alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act, which prohib-
its discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including discrimination
on the basis of religion.8 1 This claim, however, was also dismissed by the
court.82 Of the remaining civil rights laws, only two expressly deal with re-
ligious discrimination-the statutes commonly known as Title II83 and Title
VII. 84 Of these two, Title VII does not provide relief for the students, as it
regulates exclusively in the area of employment discrimination.8 5 Title II is
thus the only potentially applicable religious discrimination statute. It,
however, will not assist private-college students.
A. Title 11: The Public Accommodations Statute
The federal public accommodations statute entitles "[a]ll persons.., to
the full and equal enjoyment of the ... privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation.., without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
86
On its face, this statute may appear to be the answer to the religious stu-
dents' problem. If a private school could be classified as a public accom-
modation, one could argue that a private university that fails to accommo-
date the students' religious needs would violate this law.87
The Supreme Court has yet to apply the statute to a scenario of religious
discrimination in an educational context. The Court, however, has ad-
gender discrimination is accounted for in Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). See infra note
105.
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994) (providing, in part, that "it shall be unlawful ... [t]o
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling... because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin").
82 See infra note 91 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of the court's reason-
ing); see also infra note 96 (arguing for the necessity of this Comment's proposal even if the
fair housing claim would win on appeal).
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
84 See id. § 2000e.
85 See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that Title VII only applies in "employment, not educa-
tional, settings").
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
87 The students' position can be formulated in a number of ways. Section 2000a-2 pro-
tects all individuals from intimidation and punishment as a result of exercising their rights
under § 2000a. See id. § 2000a-2 ("No person shall (a) withhold, deny.... (b) intimidate,
threaten, or coerce .... (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting
to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 2000a... of this title."). Accordingly,
the plaintiffs could argue that Yale withheld or denied their rights to "full enjoyment" of their
college education, contingent on discriminatory demands. Alternatively, they could argue that
being forced to pay for dorm rooms that they could not use "punishes" them for exercising
their protected rights.
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dressed some issues relevant to this question. In Runyon v. McCrary,88 for
example, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a provision of the civil rights
statutes, barred a private, nonsectarian school from racially discriminating
in its admissions policy.89  In dicta, the Court implied that Title II also
would apply to discriminatory action by a private nonsectarian school that
would otherwise accept any qualified applicant.90 Accordingly, the plain-
tiffs could argue that Yale's religious discrimination is regulated by this
statute.
This argument, however, will fail for the same reason that the district
court rejected the students' fair housing claim. Like the Fair Housing stat-
ute, Title II does not contain any provision imposing an affirmative duty to
accommodate religious requests. 91 There is sound public policy underlying
this omission. It would be impractical, under Title II, to impose on every
inn, restaurant, hotel, and public place a duty to accommodate the various
religious needs of the general population. Only in Title VII, which regulates
the employment context, did Congress extend this degree of protection, to
88 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
89 See id. at 173 (holding that discrimination in the admissions decisions of private
schools violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981). The plaintiffs also filed a Title II claim, but later aban-
doned it. See id. at 164 n.2.
90 See id. at 173 n.10 (recognizing explicitly that "Title II ... does not by its terms reach
private schools," but suggesting that so-called "private" universities would still be subject to
Title II because a school which accepts any qualified applicant is not "private" for purposes of
Title II, and would have to conform to the limitations of Title II as a "public accommoda-
tion").
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making it "an unlawful employment practice... to dis-
criminate against any individual .. . because of such individual's... religion"); id. § 2000e(j)
(defining the term "religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance... unless an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an em-
ployee's ... religious observance"). No court has ever held that Title II imposes an affirma-
tive duty to accommodate.
In truth, there is a reasonable accommodations provision in the Fair Housing Act. See id.
§ 3604(f)(3) (defining "discrimination" to include the refusal to permit "reasonable modifica-
tion" of premises at the expense of the handicapped person). It is limited, however, to man-
dating accommodations for physically handicapped individuals. See id. The Hack court
stated that because the statute specifically provides accommodations for physical handicaps,
"[the statute cannot be construed to mean that refusal to make reasonable accommodations
constitutes discrimination in any other context." Hack v. President of Yale College, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 183, 193 (D. Conn. 1998).
The court's reasoning leaves room for the students to argue that where a statute is silent
on the issue of reasonable accommodations, such as in Title II, it may be interpreted to require
a university to accommodate the plaintiffs in order to avoid discrimination under that statute.
Ultimately, however, this argument would not be persuasive, as no court has ever read Title II
to require an affirmative duty to accommodate. The Hack court simply put forth its strongest
argument against requiring religious accommodations under the Fair Housing Act. The opin-
ion does not, however, intend to intimate that other statutes without an express provision
mandating accommodations should be construed to require them.
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ensure "employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society"
without regard to race, religion or gender.
92
Even if, hypothetically, the current Title VII standard of accommoda-
tion applied to Title II and Fair Housing cases, religious students may still
find themselves without recourse. In Ansonia Board of Education v. Phil-
brook,93 the Court held that if the employer offers to make any reasonable
accommodation, even if it is not to the employee's liking, then the employer
has discharged its obligation to accommodate. Here, Yale engaged in ex-
tensive negotiations in which several proposals were suggested before
reaching an impasse with the Yale Five.94 None of these suggestions satis-
fied the students, although courts may have deemed them to be reasonable.
Thus, even if a court were to read an accommodation duty into Title II and
the Fair Housing Act, it would not require more than the existing duties cre-
ated by Title VII, still leaving the students without a remedy.95
B. Normative and Policy Arguments Supporting a Legislative Proposal to
Impose a Duty to Accommodate on Private Universities
Since a private school is not a state actor, there is virtually no legal re-
course for religious students in private schools who demand reasonable re-
ligious accommodations. 96 The federal anti-discrimination statutes do not
92 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
479 U.S. 60 (1986). In Ansonia, the Court maintained that there was "no basis in ei-
ther the statute [Title VII] or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any
particular reasonable accommodation." Id. at 68.
94 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (detailing the negotiations between Yale and
the students).
95 See infra note 154 (suggesting that the standard of accommodation of Title VII cases
would not offer effective relief to the Yale Five); infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing how the
Ansonia ruling effects this Comment's legislative proposal). There is another limitation to the
accommodation provision of Title VII. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 84-85 (1977), the Court held that, under Title VII, an employer has to bear no more than a
de minimis cost in accommodating the religious request of an employee. This Comment will
discuss later how much that standard would affect the students' requests to live off-campus.
See infra Part III.C (addressing the potential reach of reasonable accommodations); see also
infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the proposed statute should define reasonable accommoda-
tion).
96 As noted earlier, the students advanced a number of creative statutory and common
law theories, including claims under the Fair Housing and Sherman Antitrust Acts. See Hack,
16 F. Supp. 2d at 192-97; see also supra notes 7, 78 (noting that the Yale Five advanced nu-
merous statutory claims). Even if these nonconstitutional claims would succeed on an appeal,
federal legislative remedies still would be necessary to ensure that students' religious free-
doms are protected. As a matter of public policy, parties should not be forced to assert their
religious discrimination claims in a backhanded manner, for example, via the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.
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sufficiently fill the gap between the obligations that the Constitution im-
poses on the State and the less inclusive statutory imperatives for private
citizens.97 This result does not fit well with the government's general policy
against other forms of discrimination in public and private education.
Moreover, given the close connection between higher education and em-
ployment opportunities, it is inconsistent that an employee is not forced to
choose between professional advancement and religion, while a college stu-
dent must do so. Finally, there are several indicators that congressional and
public opinions support more, not less, accommodation for religious practi-
tioners.
1. The Importance of Higher Education and Title VII
In today's society, education is closely linked with success in the job
market.98  A growing number of professions require college and graduate
degrees as prerequisites. In today's job market, even these degrees do not
always suffice.99 Furthermore, the quality of the education has an enormous
impact on the student's potential for professional advancement.100 Failure
Moreover, the Fair Housing Act is insufficient statutory protection for religious students.
Only the specific request at issue in the Yale case, relating to a dorm requirement, allowed the
students to allege a violation of the Fair Housing Act (which, as mentioned earlier, was dis-
missed). All other requests for religious accommodations, however, would not benefit from
any of the civil rights laws and would remain unprotected. Therefore, from a normative per-
spective, there should be a civil rights statute more directly addressing this problem.
97 See supra Part I (detailing the constitutional requirements to provide religious accom-
modations); Part lI.A (analyzing Title II in light of this problem).
98 See President William J. Clinton, Remarks to Students and Teachers of Houston High
Schools (Jan. 9, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5403 (emphasizing that education is "not just an
advantage," but rather a "necessity"). Among other things, the President noted that while 20
years ago, college graduates earned 40% more than high school graduates, "[today... the
gap has gone to 75 percent." 1d.; see also Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks at Syracuse
University (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.federalreserve.gov:80/
BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/19971203.htm> (noting that "education, especially to enhance
advanced skills, is so vital to the future growth of our economy" and that "broader human
capital skills have been associated with higher education"). Chairman Greenspan also con-
cluded that "the demand for college-trained workers has been increasing rapidly." Id.
99 See, e.g., Lisa Benavides, Plain MBAs May No Longer Be Enough, GANNETr NEWs
SERvIcE, Dec. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8843298 (reporting that "[t]here are many
jobs where an employer specifies you need an MBA" and that there "may be the need for
ever-advanced degrees ... [with the] MBA... becom[ing] more of a front-end preparation
for a career" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100 See, e.g., Workplace in the 21st Century: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce (statement of Ed
Montgomery, Chief Economist, Dep't of Labor), Oct. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 679258
(testifying that the "evidence is clear that people with more education and skills do substan-
tially better in today's economy"). In the Hack case, the plaintiffs, in support of their antitrust
argument, put forth the argument that a Yale education is unique. See Complaint, supra note
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to make religious accommodations in a university setting, then, is compara-
ble to a similar refusal to accommodate in the workplace. Thus, it would be
manifestly unfair to prevent a qualified student from attending the college of
her choice because of an inflexible housing policy.
The case law of Title VII explains that the purpose of the statute is to
guarantee full access to employment for all members of our pluralistic soci-
ety-without having to choose between profession and religion.10, Because
higher education is directly correlated with future professional achievement,
it would be inconsistent with the public policy underlying Title VII to allow
religious discrimination in education.
10 2
2. The Federal Government's Policy Against Discrimination in Education
The federal government has a long history of combating discrimination
in all forms of education. Perhaps the most well known are the Supreme
Court decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Education,10 3 which used the
Equal Protection Clause to end the era of segregated public schools.
10 4
1, 95 ("[A] Yale degree has unique attributes that make it without substitute or equal.").
Although the court rejected this argument in that context, see Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 195-97,
it fits quite well into an analogy to Title VII. The future earning potential of a student could
be seriously affected by not attending Yale.
101 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (stating that Title ViI's constitutionality
rests on its valid secular purpose and protections of employment opportunity); see also Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that the secular purpose of Title VII is to protect the employment opportunities of
members of minority religions); Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp 1305, 1312-13 (S.D.
Iowa 1993) (noting that the purpose of outlawing religious discrimination in employment is to
ensure that workers are hired and retained on the basis of skill, not religious practices and be-
liefs), affd inpart and rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158
(1996).
102 The argument that we must protect individuals from employment discrimination prior
to their becoming employees is not unprecedented. Title VII itself protects not only actual
employees but also applicants and, under certain circumstances, individuals who have not
even applied for a job. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in the
hiring of employees); see also Robinson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 823 F.2d 793, 796 (4th
Cir. 1987) (stating that Title VII protection can extend even to individuals who did not apply
for a job when it is clear that they would be subject to discrimination in the hiring process).
Thus, Congress has extended protection to potential employees. Nevertheless, the case law
clearly establishes that Title VII is not applicable in the Hack case. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc.
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991)
(stating that Title VII only applies in employment, and not educational, settings). The Hack
case does, however, show the inconsistency between the policy behind Title VII and the result
of its application. This anomalous result lends support to the argument that there should be
some other statutory remedy for religious university students who are denied reasonable re-
ligious accommodations.
103 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding the states to "deny to any per-
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Congress expanded on the protections offered directly by the Constitution
by passing legislation outlawing racial and gender discrimination in both
public and private education.105 The courts, too, attacked discrimination in
areas other than constitutional law, and construed various congressional acts
as prohibiting educational discrimination on the basis of race."' Neverthe-
less, despite judicial and legislative activism aimed at preventing both racial
and gender discrimination, there has been relatively little governmental ef-
fort to curb religious intolerance in the education context.
3. Congressional and Public Opinion Support More
Religious Accommodation
The issues raised by students such as Michael Rader and the Yale Five
did not appear in a vacuum. Over the last several years, public opinion has
shifted towards greater religious practice and, consequently, more tolerance
and accommodation.10 7 Professionals are taking time out of their workdays
son.. equal protection of the laws").
105 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (Title IX) (regulating gender discrimination in edu-
cation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1994) (protecting against racial discrimination in public educa-
tion); see also id. § 2000d-4a (including private colleges and universities within the reach of
Title VI, which outlaws racial discrimination in those activities that receive federal finding);
Radcliffv. Landau, 883 F.2d 1481, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Title VI to a private law
school accepting federal financial assistance).
106 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983) (holding that a
private university which enforces discriminatory practices does not qualify for tax exempt
status, as it violates the 'national policy to discourage ... discrimination in education' (cit-
ing Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, at 231)); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170-75
(1976) (stating in dicta that the federal public accommodation statute applies to a private, non-
sectarian school that accepts any qualified applicant); see also Radcliff 883 F.2d at 1482-83
(appIying Title VI to a private law school accepting federal financial assistance).
PIN See, e.g., Andrea Heiman, Back to Basics: Orthodox Movements Like Aish HaTorah
Are Galvanizing Jews to Return to Their Roots, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997 (Magazine), at 10,
10-14, 28, 30 (reporting on an Orthodox Jewish movement aimed at bringing secularized Jews
back to the Orthodox faith); Ron Stodghill II et al., God of Our Fathers: The Promise Keep-
ers Are Bringing Their Manly Crusade to Washington, TIME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 34 (reporting on
the religious revival among Christian American men through the Promise Keepers); Elwood
Watson, America's Experiencing a Spiritual Revival, HEADWAY, Feb. 28, 1997, at 14, 14
("Some people believe [that America is] on the verge of another great [religious] awaken-
ing."). This trend of religious revitalization can be seen worldwide as well. See, e.g., Abu
Ibrahim et al., Religious Revival Becomes a Trend Among Local Moslems, JAKARTA POST,
Aug. 12, 1997, at 9 (noting the return of many Moslems to their faith); Jack Kelley, Cuba:
After Four Decades of Communism, Faith Has Hold on Masses, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1998,
at IA (reporting on Pope John Paul II's momentous visit to Cuba in the context of "a major
religious revival"); Stuart Vincent, The Newsday Interview with Eric Yoffie: Jewish Educa-
tion Is My Primary Concern, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1996, at A33 (noting a "religious re-
vival" among Reform Jews).
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to study and contemplate the teachings of their faiths. 108 Others have taken
on religious obligations and practices which "interfere" with employers' ex-
pectations of appropriate dress and attendance at work. 09 Employers have
been less than amicable in response to this trend. Employees, in turn, have
looked to Title VII for assistance. The number of complaints of religious
intolerance filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
"EEOC") has risen dramatically since the beginning of this decade.
110
This newfound interest in religion has not been limited to the work-
place. Although only Rader and the Yale Five have received national at-
tention, an increasing number of students have requested various religious
accommodations from their school administrations."' Furthermore, a num-
ber of congressional actions reflect this recent sensitivity to religion, deriv-
ing from a policy of greater religious tolerance. Most notable was the pas-
sage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the "RFRA")11
2
(subsequently held to be unconstitutional) in response to the Court's deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith.' In a very unpopular decision,"
4
108 See David W. Chen, Fitting the Lord into Work's Tight Schedules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1997, at Al (reporting how a great number of professionals of various religions meet dur-
ing the workday for prayer meetings, study sessions, and other religiously oriented activities).
109 See Stephanie Armour, Religion, Workplace Collide: Conflict Grows Between
Bosses, Devout Workers, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1997, at IB (recounting numerous incidents
where individuals faced discrimination at work because of religious garb or the observance of
religious holidays); Jane Easter BahIs, Make Room for Diverse Beliefs, HR MAG., Aug. 1,
1997, at 89, 89-90, 92, 95 (reporting an increasing number of nontraditional or informal re-
ligious practices in the workplace and the need for their accommodation).
10 See Armour, supra note 109, at IB (noting that, by the end of the federal govern-
ment's fiscal year, the number of religious discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC had
"soared 43%, from 1,192 cases in 1991 to 1,709 in... 1997"); Bahls, supra note 109, at 90
(reporting that the EEOC "received more than 1,560 allegations of religious discrimination [in
19961, up almost 31 percent from 1991").
See Glaberson, supra note 4, at 45 (quoting an expert on higher education as saying
that "Yale's dilemma [with requests for religious accommodations] is a common one on cam-
puses in the 1990's"); Morning Edition, supra note 62 ("Higher education experts say dis-
putes like the one going on at Yale are becoming common.").
112 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (declared unconstitutional in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117
S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997)).
113 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause permits a state to
prohibit the use of peyote for sacramental purposes and therefore permits the state to deny
unemployment benefits for persons discharged for such use of peyote).
114 See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176-85 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Smith "adopted an improper standard for deciding free exercise
claims"); Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-77 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the Smith rule is inconsistent
with the "original understanding and purpose" of the Free Exercise Clause); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1109,
1114-53 (1990) (objecting to the Smith opinion's use of legal sources and to its theoretical
argument).
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the Supreme Court held in Smith that a neutral and generally applicable law
was constitutional, even though the law infringed upon some constituencies'
free exercise of religion.115 Not only was this decision criticized in Con-
gress (to the extent that Congress subsequently overruled Smith by enacting
the RFRA), but the holding was also questioned by prominent legal scholars
and several members of the Court itself.'
16
Congress's fight to guarantee religious freedom has not ended on the
First Amendment front. Rather, Congress is now considering further legis-
lation to curtail religious discrimination by private actors. Currently, there
is a legislative proposal in both houses of Congress that would overrule two
key Supreme Court decisions which severely hinder the effectiveness of Ti-
tle VII's religious accommodation requirements. 117  This debate demon-
strates the level of importance that the American public and legislature at-
tach to the need for religious accommodation by private actors.
4. Summary of Policy Arguments
Congress used the civil rights statutes to extend the government's anti-
discrimination policy beyond state actors bound by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Yet the facts of the Hack case yield a result where a state university
must accommodate its students, while a private school has no such require-
ment. Given the importance of higher education and the government's role
in promoting equality in education, as well as current public approval of re-
ligion and religious expression, Congress should pass legislation extending
the duty to accommodate religious practices to private universities.
118
115 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882, 890. In Smith, the Court ruled on the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to workers who had been discharged due to their illegal drug use. The
Court held that, although the employees took the drugs as part of a religious ritual, they were
not protected by the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause, the Court maintained, does
not allow the violation of neutral, generally applicable laws. See id. at 879-82; see also supra
notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Smith holding to the
Yale case).
116 See supra note 114 (listing cases in which members of the Court disagree with the
Smith decision).
17 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8590 (daily
ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry); see also H.R. 2948, 144 CONG REC. E4 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Goodling) (introducing H.R. 2948, a companion bill to
Senator Kerry's proposed amendments to Title VII). The two cases that the proposed legisla-
tion intends to overrule are Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), and
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
118 Professor Michael Doff, in a recently published essay, presents and ultimately rejects
the proposition that Yale should be statutorily mandated to accommodate students such as the
Yale Five. Doff, supra note 19, at 862. Dorf agrees that a state university in a similar situa-
tion should (and probably would) have a duty to accommodate under the First Amendment.
See id. at 861. Moreover, he urges Yale "to grant exemptions as a matter of its own compre-
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION IMPOSED BY STATE
OR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Whenever Congress or any governmental actor accommodates a relig-
ious practice, constitutional problems are bound to arise. Although Con-
gress is obligated to allow the free exercise of religion, it is (at the very
least) prohibited from establishing laws mandating religious beliefs or prac-
tices.119 Particularly with respect to private actors, Congress has to be espe-
cially careful not to mandate religion, lest it violate the Establishment
Clause. Thus, in order to determine the constitutionally permissible scope
of proposed legislation that requires religious accommodations from private
hensively liberal principles." Id. at 862. Nonetheless, Dorf maintains that requiring Yale, as a
matter of law, to accommodate the students "would be to deny the institution's nomic charac-
ter," and doing so would be an inappropriate response by the state. Id.
This Comment, however, concludes that the interests at issue are sufficiently important to
warrant legislation, even if that requires denying Yale its nomic character. After drawing his
distinction between Yale and similarly situated state universities, Dorf pauses to recognize the
limits to which Yale (or any other institution) should enjoy nomic sovereignty. See id. at 865-
68. He notes that a military academy would not be insulated from "criminal or civil liability
for brutal batteries on the ground that this is understood as permissible hazing within the col-
lege's distinct nomos." Id. at 867. Once Dorf concedes that the issue is one of degree, the
line allowing a nomic institution autonomy from state interference can be drawn elsewhere.
While Dorf attaches great significance to Yale's retention of its nomic character, this Com-
ment argues that, for the policy reasons outlined above, the importance of providing religious
accommodations for university students overrides these other considerations. Therefore, leg-
islation is appropriate.
119 See supra note 7 (citing the prohibitions of the First Amendment religion clauses).
The precise limitations that the Establishment Clause imposes remain unclear after the Su-
preme Court's last decision on the matter. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 598-99 (1992),
the Court held that a public school could not provide for a prayer to be recited at graduation-
even if the prayer was "nonsectarian." There, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
framed the issue as one of state coercion of religion. See id. at 599 (holding that the govern-
ment may not "compel a student to participate in a religious exercise"). Several Justices in
concurrence, however, maintained that "it is not enough that the government restrain from
compelling religious practices: It must not engage in them either." Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (noting further that the "Court repeatedly has recognized that a violation of the
Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion"); see also id. at 619 (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the Supreme Court precedent "cannot. .. support the position that a show-
ing of coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim"). Given this am-
bivalence within the majority, the development of the actual standard remains to be seen.
Thus, the language in the text asserts only that the government, at the very least, cannot man-
date religion. Resolution of this dispute is not necessary to the argument of this Comment. In
Lee, the Court itself limited its analysis from the outset to "the controlling precedents as they
relate to prayer and religious exercise in... public schools .. . ." Id. at 586. Thus, the Court
declined the invitation of the parties to reconsider "questions of the definition and full scope
of the principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State for the relig-
ious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens." Id. Consequently, Lee did not upset the
state of the law as explained elsewhere in this Comment.
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universities, it is necessary to examine Establishment Clause case law.
Cases discussing Title VII and its accommodation provision are especially
relevant, because this Comment's proposal, like Title VII, is to require "rea-
sonable accommodations."
A. The Constitutionality of Title VII
The extent to which Congress can require private citizens to provide re-
ligious accommodations without violating the Establishment Clause is a
question of degree. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.120 is a seminal case in
determining the precise limit of this congressional power. In Estate of
Thornton, the Court held that a Connecticut law allowing every employee to
choose any day of the week as her Sabbath violated the Establishment
Clause. 12 1 The Court stressed that ' [t]he First Amendment... gives no
one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must con-
form their conduct to his own religious necessities."' 122 This Connecticut
statute left the absolute power in the hands of the employee, with the right
to demand leave for any one day of the week. Furthermore, the employee's
choice of day was not limited by any potentially adverse consequences to
her employer or fellow employees. The Court maintained that this extreme
and absolute privilege, granted to Sabbath observers above all others, was
unconstitutional.
123
Interestingly enough, the majority opinion did not explain why other
statutes making religious accommodations were constitutional. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurrence, addressed this implicit question left unan-
120 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
121 See id. at 710-11.
122 Id. at 710 (Hand, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.,
205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
123 See id. at 710-11. In reaching its decision, the Court paid lip-service to the well-
known, three-part Lemon test as the basis for its holding. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971) (requiring a statute to (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not foster excessive
entanglement of the government with religion; and (3) not have the primary effect of advanc-
ing or inhibiting religion in order to pass muster under the First Amendment). After briefly
stating the standard set forth in Lemon, however, the Court in Estate of Thornton pursued its
own line of analysis, turning on and closing with the remarks quoted above from Judge
Learned Hand. See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 410. Members of the Court have noted
the Court's inconsistent application of the Lemon test. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 750-51 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing the Court's erratic relationship with the Lemon test). Therefore, although some of the
decisions (including Estate of Thornton) periodically "rely" on the Lemon test, my discussion
will view Estate of Thornton as formulating its own standard for testing the constitutionality
of government imposed religious accommodations.
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
swered by the majority. 124 She distinguished the Court's holding in Estate
of Thornton from Title VII and the strong assumption of constitutionality
that it enjoys. 25 Justice O'Connor emphasized three points in drawing her
distinction. First, Title VII, as opposed to the Connecticut statute, has a
manifest secular purpose of allowing all members of "our pluralistic soci-
ety" 126 equal opportunity to work. In a second related point, Justice
O'Connor noted that Title VII protects "all religious beliefs and practices
rather than protecting only the Sabbath observance."'127 Finally, the reason-
able nature of Title ViI's accommodation, versus the absolutist approach of
the Connecticut statute, keeps the former from running afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
128
B. The Application ofEstate of Thornton
The Estate of Thornton decision has been discussed by the Court in
several other cases where there was arguably preferential treatment given to
a religious constituency. By looking to these other cases for guidance in
reading Estate of Thornton, the Court's holding becomes clearer and the
124 See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining why
"the Court's opinion [does not] suggest[] that the religious accommodation provisions of Title
VII" are unconstitutional).
125 In addition to Justice Marshall's statement in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 90 & n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute outlawing em-
ployment discrimination has a valid secular purpose of assuring opportunities to all groups in
our pluralistic society), upon which Justice O'Connor based her conclusions, a number of
lower courts also declared that Title VII was free of Establishment Clause concerns. See, e.g.,
McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the accommo-
dations provision of Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause); Tooley v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1981) (maintaining that accommodations
under Title VII are constitutional); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 43-44
(8th Cir. 1975) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Likewise, since Estate of
Thornton, lower courts have repeatedly upheld Title VII as constitutional. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the accommodation provi-
sion has a secular purpose and therefore is consistent with the First Amendment); Vigars v.
Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 809-10 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); see also Workplace
Religious Freedom Act, 143 CONG. REc. S8590 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Kery) (assuming that there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Title
VII and its religious accommodation provision).
126 Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 Id. But see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1307 n.31 (1994) (arguing that O'Connor's reasoning in Estate of
Thornton is not compelling because of the possibility that Connecticut intended its statute to
alleviate a burden, rather than to endorse a particular religion).
128 See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that stat-
utes that make constitutional religious accommodations have a manifest secular purpose; pro-
tect all religious beliefs and practices; and demonstrate a reasonable, rather than an absolutist,
approach).
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permissible parameters of this Comment's proposed legislation become
more defined.
1. Breadth of the Accommodations
Shortly after Estate of Thornton was decided, the Court again faced
the issue of conflict between Sabbath observance and the workplace. In
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,129 the state commission de-
nied unemployment benefits to an employee after her employer discharged
her for refusing to work on her Sabbath.130 The Court held that granting her
governmental unemployment benefits did not violate the Establishment
Clause, even though this gave special status to a religious practitioner.1
31
Although Hobbie, like Estate of Thornton, deals with state-granted benefits
to Sabbath observers, Hobbie is still easily distinguished from Estate of
Thornton. In Estate of Thornton, only Sabbath observers benefited from the
accommodation provided; in Hobbie, in contrast, all religious groups re-
ceived accommodation from the state. There is nothing per se offensive,
however, in allowing accommodations to Sabbath observers.
Although the Court does not say so explicitly, its opinion in Hobbie
clearly endorses Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Estate of Thornton.
Ultimately, the Court's reasoning rests on the breadth of the accommoda-
tion, a focus upon which O'Connor relied in distinguishing Estate of
Thornton from Title VII. 132 This distinction is especially relevant to the
discussion of state-mandated religious accommodation by private universi-
ties. This Comment's proposed legislation would avoid a conflict with the
Establishmfent Clause by requiring private universities to accommodate all
religious practices equally. Since there is no rationale for limiting the pro-
posal to any one religious practice, there is little reason to fear that the Court
would find the proposal unconstitutional on these grounds.
129 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
130 See id. at 137.
131 See id. at 144-45. The thrust of the Court's decision deals with the Free Exercise, not
the Establishment, Clause. The employee contended, and the Court agreed, that the state un-
employment commission could not deny the benefits in this case without violating the Free
Exercise Clause. The commission, however, raised the Establishment Clause as a defense for
its actions. Relying on Estate of Thornton, the commission argued that since it was a state
actor, giving the Sabbath observer special status should be prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. There, the Court disagreed.
132 See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that "[t]he statute singles out Sabbath observers for special.., protection without according
similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs"); cf Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11
(stating that Florida's granting "of unemployment benefits to religious observers does not sin-
gle out a particular class of such persons ... and thereby have the effect of implicitly endors-
ing a particular religious belief').
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In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court reiterated Justice
O'Connor's assertion that religious accommodation must be sufficiently
broad. 133 In that case, the Court struck down a state tax exemption available
only to religious publications. Based on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Estate of Thornton, the Court argued that since the Texas sales tax exemp-
tion did not extend to other publications of nonreligious moral and ethical
material, it was unconstitutional.
134
Texas Monthly's holding touches upon a related, but different, criterion
from the one relied upon in Hobbie. In Texas Monthly, the Court stresses
the requirement that a statute have a secular purpose. This requirement ex-
tends beyond the prohibition of singling out a certain religious group or
practice. Even if legislation grants equal protection to all religions, the law
will be unconstitutional if it does not serve some secular purpose. 3 5 Title
VII has a secular purpose, and is therefore constitutional, because the relig-
ious employee is only one of many who are protected.136
Although this Comment's proposal would be limited to prohibiting re-
ligious discrimination on-campus as opposed to in the workplace, there
should still be no Establishment Clause concerns. Currently, existing pro-
tection from racial and gender discrimination in education would place
regulation of religious discrimination in a secular context. 137 Thus, no new
legislation regarding other forms of discrimination would need to be passed,
as the stage is already set for Congress to simply create another protected
class.
133 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
134 See id. at 16 ("[T]he exemption could not be reserved for publications dealing solely
with religious issues .... ); cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361-67 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in result) (maintaining that conscientious objector to war status cannot be lim-
ited to those with religious objections, but must be extended to protesters with moral, ethical,
or philosophical complaints).
135 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 16 n.6 (pointing out that Texas's exemption is even
more offensive given other state tax exemptions that do serve a secular purpose by including
charitable and educational organizations together with religious ones); see also Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (implying that the government generally cannot direct a
subsidy exclusively to religious groups without endorsing religion).
See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "a
statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring employment opportunities to all groups in our
pluralistic society").
137 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (detailing laws preventing racial and
gender discrimination in education).
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2. Burdens and Effects on Other Constituencies
There is yet another point in Estate of Thornton that is relevant in pre-
dicting potential Establishment Clause problems with proposed religious ac-
commodation legislation. This factor does not come from Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, but rather from the opinion of the Court. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger argued that one crucial factor in ren-
dering the Connecticut Sabbath-observance accommodation statute uncon-
stitutional was that it had a deleterious impact on employers and fellow em-
ployees. 138 The fact that the statute took "no account of the convenience or
interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a
Sabbath" was one of the law's fatal flaws.
139
In later cases, the Court recognized the importance of taking into ac-
count the effect that religious accommodation has on others. 140 It is clear,
however, that a statute is not per se burdensome simply because religious
parties receive a benefit and nonreligious parties do not. For example, in
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,141 the
Court addressed whether a school district comprised exclusively of Satmar
Hasidim (an ultra-Orthodox Jewish sect)142 could receive state funding,
while remaining true to the Establishment Clause. 43 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the school district's funding was unconstitutional. 144 In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that in Estate of Thornton, the Sabbath-
observance accommodation was invalid due to the burden it placed on non-
Sabbath observers. Justice Kennedy concluded in Kiryas Joel, however,
that the creation of a Satmar-only school district would not significantly
burden non-Satmars. 146 Even though Justice Kennedy readily admitted that
138 See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 (stating that a statute violates the First
Amendment "when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organiza-
tions... and... burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly").
141 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
142 The Court provided the following brief description of Satmar Hasidim:
The [Hasidim] are vigorously religious people who make few concessions to the
modem world and go to great lengths to avoid assimilation into it. They interpret the
Torah strictly; segregate the sexes outside the home; speak Yiddish as their primary
language; eschew television, radio, and English-language publications; and dress in
distinctive ways that include headcoverings and special garments for boys and mod-
est dresses for girls.
Id. at 691.
143 See id. at 696.
144 See id. at 702-10.
145 See id. at 725 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 See id. at 724-25.
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"[t]here is a point.., at which an accommodation may impose a burden on
nonadherents so great that it becomes an establishment," 147 the mere exis-
tence of an accommodation which exclusively benefits a religious group is
by no means per se prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
This analysis is very important with respect to this Comment's legisla-
tive proposal. In the employment context, in order to allow religious em-
ployees their necessary accommodations, employers would necessarily lose
revenues and employees would have to shift their work schedules. The pri-
vate university setting, however, does not present the same imposition on
the relevant nonreligious parties. There is no reason to believe that accom-
modating religious students would burden nonreligious students in any
meaningful manner. Thus, while Estate of Thornton and its progeny
control this issue in an employment context, a statute regulating religious
accommodations by private universities would be constitutionally sound.
C. The Extent of Reasonable Accommodations
The Court's interpretation of Estate of Thornton leads to the conclusion
that a statute which reasonably accommodates a broad range of religious
practices, placed in a greater secular context, and which would not signifi-
cantly burden nonreligious constituencies, would be within the confines of
the First Amendment. The line of cases citing Estate of Thornton discusses
and defines these factors: the necessary breadth of the accommodation, the
definition of a "secular" context, as well as what is considered to be "bur-
densome" on others. 49  The definition of "reasonable accommodations,"
however, is not directly put forth in those cases.
The Court, however, has interpreted reasonableness in the statutory set-
ting of Title VII. This interpretation yielded a reading of the statute that
imposes nothing more than a de minimis obligation on the employer.
150
147 Id. at 725. Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court that the creation of such a school
district was unconstitutional for other reasons. See id. at 722, 728 ("[I]n my view one such
fundamental limitation [imposed by the Establishment Clause] is that government may not use
religo n as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines.").
1 Indeed, Justice Kennedy maintained that the creation of an entire school district, de-
signed exclusively to accommodate a religious group, could be consistent with the Establish-
ment Clause insofar as it did not burden others. See id. at 725. The argument, thus, is that
nonreligious students do experience significant sacrifices or losses when religious students
receive accommodations. At Yale, non-Orthodox students would bear no greater burden if the
Orthodox students were allowed to live off-campus. See infra Part III.C (discussing the scope
of the reasonable accommodations requirement).
149 See supra Part III.B (discussing what is required of a statute in order not to violate the
Establishment Clause).
150 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the de minimis obligation im-
posed by Title VII's reasonable accommodations standard).
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Moreover, the employer does not even have to accept the specific reason-
able accommodation of the employee's choice.15' This limitation on Title
VII, however, was fueled by statutory interpretation, not by constitutional
imperative. In fact, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 15 both the
Court and Justice Marshall in dissent left open the question of how much
more than a de minimis obligation Congress could require without violating
the Establishment Clause. Thus, the extent of the obligation that could be
imposed on private universities is left unresolved by the courts. 53 Never-
theless, there is no reason to doubt that a statute in the education context
could be written at least as strongly as Title VII (requiring a de minimis ef-
fort) without any constitutional trouble.
This entire discussion may be moot, however. It may still be possible
to make effective reasonable accommodations in the private university set-
ting, even with a simple de minimis obligation.154 Employers create rules in
151 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing Ansonia's limitation on the
Title VII reasonable accommodation standard).
152 432 U.S. 63, 70 (1977) (noting that, since the Court found that TWA was not required
to bear more than a de minimis cost to avoid Title VII liability, it was unnecessary to address
Establishment Clause concerns); id. at 90 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (leaving "for another
day the merits of any constitutional objections that could be raised if the law were construed
to require employers (or employees) to assume significant costs in accommodating").
The proposal for the Workplace Religious Freedom Act insists that placing more than
a de minimis obligation on an employer for the purposes of Title VII would be constitutional.
See Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REc. S8590, S8590 (daily
ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (arguing that his proposal is "constitutional be-
cause it simply clarifies existing law... strengthening the required standard [of religious ac-
commodation]"). Even trusting Senator Kerry's constitutional expertise, this statement is not
dispositive on the issue. Senator Kerry only compares the proposed legislation to the RFRA
and assures the President that the new and improved Title VII would not exceed Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment as the RFRA did. See id. He did not, however, dis-
cuss potential First Amendment challenges.
This does not imply, however, that the same standard that currently applies to Title
VII would be effective in the Yale case. Indeed, if that standard were applied to this Com-
ment's proposal, then the plight of religious students would not be alleviated. As mentioned
above, under Title VII the employer does not have to accept the employee's suggested ac-
commodation to fulfill its obligation to accommodate. The Court in Ansonia Board of Edu-
cation v. Philbrook held that as long as there is a showing that the employer was willing to
provide some reasonable accommodation, there is no liability under federal law. See 479 U.S.
60, 68 (1986); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. The question of whether a uni-
versity's response is "reasonable" will then be left in the hands ofjudges and juries.
Nevertheless, the Ansonia analysis is ultimately irrelevant. The only reason to limit this
proposal would be due to any constitutional constraints. As mentioned earlier, the Court's
discussion and decision in Ansonia revolves entirely around statutory interpretation. See 479
U.S. at 68; see also supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing
how this Comment's proposal, by explicitly defining the term "reasonable accommodations,"
will prevent the Court from reducing the requirements of the proposed accommodations pro-
vision).
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the workplace to enhance efficiency and ultimately increase the bottom line.
Thus, allowing a Sabbath-observing employee to choose his or her vacation
time, without regard for company rules, can lead to inefficiency and lost
revenues.1 55 In contrast to the workplace, most university rules regulating
student life (other than requiring the payment of tuition) are generally not
designed to generate income. A student requesting to live off-campus does
not create the efficiency problems that an employee who chooses her own
vacation time does. An accommodation that would require a substantial
cost to an employer may only impose a de minimis cost on a university.
Therefore, a de minimis obligation helps students significantly more than it
helps employees.
The de minimis obligation, however, leaves room for the university to
assert a strong reply to a student requesting an exemption to a residency re-
quirement. Under such a standard, the university, in theory, may argue that
losing the cost of the dormitory fee is more than a de minimis cost.' 56 It is
doubtful, however, that universities would utilize this defense. Universities
would be unlikely to readily admit and publicly proclaim that they make a
profit from the dormitories. In response to Michael Rader's suit, UNK ad-
mitted only reluctantly (and during cross-examination) that one of the func-
tions of its parietal rule was to "ensure[] full occupancy of UNK's residence
halls."'157 Yale, too, has publicly disavowed that any financial considera-
tions underlie its position regarding the Yale Five.1 58 Thus, although a mere
de minimis obligation creates a legal loophole for the universities, it is un-
likely that the universities would invoke this technicality on their behalf.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the possibility that a statute imposing a
mere de minimis obligation would be limited in its effectiveness, such a
statute will provide at least some assistance to the religious student who cur-
rently has nowhere to turn.
155 See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84-85 & n.15 (explaining how rearranging
work shifts to accommodate a Sabbath-observer will result in inefficiency and higher costs to
the company); Wilson v. U.S. W. Comm., 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995) (maintaining
that Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to impose her religious
views on the employer and others); Vetter v. Farmland Indus., 884 F. Supp. 1287, 1309 (N.D.
Iowa 1995) (stating that any cost in efficiency or wage expenditures to the employer that is
more than de minimis is not required by Title VII).
156 Indeed, the mandatory dormitory fee for one year at Yale was close to $7,000. See
Complaint, supra note 1, 23 (reporting that "Yale charged $6,850 for room and board for the
academic year 1997-1998").
157 Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1556 (D. Neb. 1996).
158 See Sachsman, supra note 5 (reporting that Yale's attorney claims that Yale has no
interest in "making money off of the students"); see also infra Part IV.B.2 (proposing the im-
plementation of a de minimis obligation).
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: MANDATING RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS BY PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES
A. Affirmative Constitutional Grant of Congressional Authority To
Regulate Discrimination in Private Education
Although Congress can draft legislation requiring religious accommo-
dations without offending the Establishment Clause, it still must find a basis
in the Constitution upon which to affirmatively justify passing that legisla-
tion. Title VII and its case law, while providing many of the normative ar-
guments and legal analogies discussed by this Comment, 159 may be neither
the best, nor a constitutional, approach.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which included Title VII) was pro-
posed, there was great debate in Congress and among legal scholars as to
which clause in the Constitution should provide the basis for the new anti-
discrimination laws.1 60  Ultimately, Congress relied on the Commerce
Clause to support the constitutionality of the new Civil Rights Act.1
61
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has survived the test of time with
the Commerce Clause as its constitutional foundation, 162 it is questionable
159 See supra Part II.B.1 (drawing support for the proposal by analogy to Title VII); Part
III (using the Title VII case law on the Establishment Clause to properly limit the scope of the
proposal).
160 There was strong support for the position that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
should serve as the constitutional basis for the statute. This school of thought argued that
Section 5, by granting Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions" of the Equal Protection Clause, provided sufficient justification to pass anti-
discrimination statutes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See Additional Views on H.R. 7152
(Hon. William M. McCulloch et al.), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487 (noting the possibility of using
the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the Civil Rights Act); see generally GERALD
GUNTHER & KAThLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITrroNAL LAW 201-03 (13th ed. 1997) (ar-
guing that the "most obviously relevant source of national [constitutional] power" to enact a
"federal ban on discrimination" is the "Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the tenuously re-
lated commerce clause" (citation and internal quotations omitted)). This argument, however,
not only failed to convince members of Congress then, but was also recently rejected by the
Supreme Court in its decision declaring the RFRA unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997) (noting that Congress cannot draw any "substan-
tive.., power" from the Enforcement Clause). Thus, in this Comment's proposal, the Four-
teenth Amendment cannot be used as the constitutional grant of power.
161 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate Com-
mere... among the several States"). Although the Commerce Clause was clearly not di-
rectly related to an anti-discrimination statute, the prevailing view in Congress was to make
use of the plenary power granted by that Clause. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 88-872, at 12 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2366-68 (supporting the position that the Commerce
Clause can and should be used as the constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
162 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is constitutional because it is supported by Congress's authority
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whether this Comment's proposal would fare as well. The Civil Rights Act
relates to various commercial activities, albeit in the context of discrimina-
tion, thereby finding a clear nexus with Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce. 163 Title VII itself provides a good illustration of this point.
Regulation in the area of employment is easily tied to the Commerce
Clause, as most forms of employment can be tied to interstate commerce.
Title II also lends support to this position, as it regulates the activities of
restaurants, hotels, and other businesses that clearly affect interstate com-
merce.
This Comment's proposal, however, is not so clearly related to the
Commerce Clause and interstate commerce. Despite the normative argu-
ments presented above outlining the connection between education and em-
ployment, the Court has shown its reluctance to recognize that relationship
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court recently struck down
a law prohibiting guns in school zones, holding that the Commerce Clause
does not give Congress the power to legislate in all areas of education.
164
The better choice for the constitutional foundation of this proposal is
the Spending Power.165  Since this proposed legislation would be visibly
tied to the private universities receiving federal funding, it would presuma-
bly be constitutional. Congress would simply attach a condition to the re-
ceipt of federal financial assistance: the provision reasonable religious ac-
commodation for the students. This approach closely follows the model of
under the Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (same).
163 See generally Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 249-62 (upholding Title II as a valid
exercise of the Commerce Power).
164 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (noting that Congress's author-
ity under the Commerce Clause "does not include the authority to regulate each and every
aspect of local schools"). There is, however, a distinction that can be drawn between the Gun-
Free School Zones Act (discussed in Lopez) and this proposal. The Court in Lopez would not
accept the argument that there was a sufficient relationship between local elementary and sec-
ondary schools, and interstate commerce, to justify Congress's authority in that case. Without
such a nexus, Congress had no jurisdictional hook on which to base its authority under the
Commerce Clause. See id. This Comment's proposal would regulate private colleges-ar-
guably institutions with a greater effect on interstate commerce. Given the Court's move to-
ward less congressional power under the Commerce Clause, however, it is safer not to rely on
it here. Moreover, the existence of a viable alternative to the Commerce Clause makes reli-
ance on it unnecessary. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (describing possible
reliance upon Congress's Spending Power to provide a constitutional basis for this proposal);
cf Dorf, supra note 19, at 865 (suggesting that Congress could pass such legislation either as
an amendment to Title VI or by creating a new statute under the authority of the Commerce
Clause .
16P See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cI. 1 (granting Congress the power to "pay the debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). See generally
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 160, at 235-48 (outlining the scope of the Spending
Power).
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race in any program receiving federal funding.166 Based on the
case law of Title VI, there is good reason to be confident that the courts
would construe this statute broadly, and universities receiving even a small
amount of federal funding would be subject to the restrictions of this Com-
ment's proposal.
167
B. Language of the Proposed Legislation
1. The Substantive Provision
As this proposal is founded on the Spending Power, like Title VI, it
would be appropriate to use that statute as the model for the proposal's
drafting. Thus, the statute would read as follows:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of religion, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any college, school, or university receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.
Like Title VI, the constitutional basis of this proposal (the Spending
Power) is clear from a plain reading of its language. Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, it would, in broad terms, prevent any university from
punishing those who wish to adhere to their religious faiths and practices
while attending college. The plight of students like Michael Rader and the
Yale Five would be remedied. These students would not have to choose
166 Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994), provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o per-
son ... shall, on the ground of race... be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Title VI includes colleges and universities
within its scope. See id. § 2000d-4a(2)(A).
167 See, e.g., Association of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 836 F. Supp. 1534,
1543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that as long as any part of a college receives federal fund-
ing, all of that college's operations are subject to Title VI); United States v. El Camino Com-
munity College Dist, 454 F. Supp. 825, 829 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that Title VI should be
construed liberally to effect its remedial purpose). Although some colleges might not be sub-
ject to this proposal, this is a relatively minor risk when compared to the possibility that the
proposal may be unconstitutional if based on the Commerce Clause. See supra note 164 (dis-
cussing the failure of the Gun-Free School Zones Act to establish congressional power to
regulate based on the Commerce Clause). Given that so many colleges and universities re-
ceive federal funding, the reach of this proposal seems sufficiently broad. Moreover, if the
proposal were founded on the Commerce Clause, it would perhaps be necessary to require a
showing that a university was substantially related to interstate commerce in order to provide
a jurisdictional hook. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
had "no requirement that [the] possession of [a] firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce" and, therefore, congressional authority under the Commerce Clause was not a
proper basis for the Act).
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between their religion and the best education for which they are qualified
and entitled to receive.
2. A Definition: "On the Ground of Religion"
Defining the phrase "on the ground of religion" presents a difficult di-
lemma. A quick review of the definitional'provisions of Title VII is illus-
trative. Title VII, in its substantive section, simply prohibits discrimination
in the workplace "because of such individual's ... religion."'168 There is no
mention of the "reasonable accommodations" obligation in Title VII's main
provision. Only in its definitional section does the statute define religion to
include the reasonable accommodations standard. 169 Moreover, the Work-
place Religious Freedom Act proposes to broaden the scope of Title VII
protection by amending one definitional section and by adding another.1 70 It
accomplishes this task by specifically redefining the term "undue hardship"
to require accommodations unless they compel an employer to incur "sig-
nificant difficulty or expense." 171 Most significantly, the Court's construc-
tion of the definitional section of Title VII has severely limited the scope of
that statute's substantive protection. 172 Thus, despite general, broad lan-
guage in the substantive section of this Comment's proposal, the phrase "on
the ground of religion" must be defined to ensure that courts properly inter-
pret the statute.
In connection with Establishment Clause concerns, there are two basic
options for defining "religion" and "reasonable accommodation.' '  The
proposal can follow the existing model of Title VII, leaving "reasonable ac-
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
169 Title VII provides: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasona-
bly accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or prac-
tice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j).
170 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act § 2(a), 143 CONG. REC. S8590 (daily ed. July
31, 1997) (proposing amendments to Title VII's existing definitional section, 42 U.S.C. §
2000eG)); id. § 2(b) (proposing an amendment to Title VII's substantive provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2, with respect to the reasonableness of accommodations).
171 Id. § 2(a)(4).
172 See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (holding that an
employer may make any reasonable accommodation to satisfy its obligation and is not re-
quired to accept an accommodation proposed by the employee); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that Title VII's term "reasonably accommodate"
imposes no more than a de minimis obligation on employers).
173 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Court's interpretation of the phrase "reasonable
accommodation," its applicability to the religious context, and Title VII's requirement of no
more than a de minimis obligation on the employer).
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commodation" or "undue hardship" defined without any specificity. 174 This
approach has the advantage of being the safest route for avoiding conflict
with the Establishment Clause. As mentioned earlier, however, the Court
has read this vague language to impose nothing more than a de minimis ob-
ligation on the employer.
175
Alternatively, the proposal can adopt the language of the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act, which strongly and clearly requires reasonable ac-
commodations that do not impose on the employer "significant" costs in ac-
commodating its employees.17 6  The Court, however, has yet to decide
whether a statute imposing significant financial burdens on an employer for
religious accommodations can be squared with the Establishment Clause.
177
Thus, this Comment's proposal is forced to choose the lesser of two
evils: assuming the risk that the Court will interpret the statute in a manner
that will not fully serve its intended purpose, or assuming the risk that the
Court will declare the law unconstitutional. In weighing these alternatives,
the possibility that the Court will strike down the proposal as unconstitu-
tional warrants adopting the "weaker" language for the proposal by follow-
ing the current, constitutional lead of Title VII. As discussed above, even a
statute mandating a simple de minimis obligation on a university could pro-
vide the legal recourse needed by an aggrieved student.1 78 A statute that is
unconstitutional, on the other hand, provides no recourse at all. Further-
more, if Congress passes the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, with its
broader definition of reasonable accommodations, and the law survives con-
stitutional challenges, Congress could then amend this Comment's proposal
to guarantee its effectiveness. As the law stands now, however, the consti-
tutional support for the stronger language is unclear. Furthermore, if the
statute is found to violate the Establishment Clause, other possible statutory
remedies for the religious student are limited, if they even exist. Thus, it is
prudent to adopt a conservative draft of the proposal to provide an aggrieved
student some recourse rather than none at all.
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994) (failing to define "reasonably accommodate" or "un-
due hardship" with any specificity).
175 See supra note 172 (citing Ansonia and Trans World Airlines as cases that have lim-
ited the scope of Title VII).
176 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act § 2(a)(4)(3), 143 CONG. REC. S8590, S8590
(daily ed. July 31, 1997) (defining "undue hardship" to "mean!] an accommodation requiring
significant difficulty or expense").
177 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing how both the Court's decision
and Marshall's dissent in Trans World Airlines failed to address the Establishment Clause
concerns, reaching a decision on other grounds).
178 See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of the de
minimis obligation and its ability to require schools to accommodate students' requests).
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Given these considerations, and drawing heavily from Title VII, this
Comment's proposal would define "religion" as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance, practice, and
belief, unless a university demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accom-
modate a student's or prospective student's religious observance, practice, or
belief without undue hardship on the administration's conduct of the univer-
sity.
3. Definition of Accommodation
The final issue to address is the definition of "accommodation" under
this proposal. As discussed above, in addition to the de minimis spending
limit, the Supreme Court in Ansonia handicapped Title VII's religious ac-
commodation provision in another way. The Court held that an employer
has no duty to "choose any particular reasonable accommodation."' 79 Thus,
an employee may remain unaccommodated even after the employer has dis-
charged its obligation to provide reasonable accommodations. 10 Even if
the employee can demonstrate that her suggestion would not create undue
hardship for the employer, while providing her more religious accommoda-
tion, the Court has ruled that the employer has no legal requirement to heed
the employee's request.
18 1
This Comment's proposal would circumvent this potential problem by
explicitly defining "reasonable accommodation" to preclude any such read-
ing by the Court. A similar approach has been suggested by the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act, in its proposed amendments of Title VII, by defin-
ing accommodation very precisely to overrule the Court's holding in
Ansonia.
82
Unlike the de minimis question discussed above, there is no constitu-
tional question raised by this Comment's proposed amendment to Title
VII. 183  The Court was free initially to interpret the accommodation re-
179 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986).
180 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act, para. 3, 143 CONG. REC. S8590 (daily ed.
July 31, 1997) (explaining that court decisions have severely hindered the effectiveness of the
required reasonable accommodations).
11 See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68 ("[There is] no basis in either the statute or its legislative
history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation....
[A]ny reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation
obligation.").
182 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act § 2(b)(o)(2) (proposing that an employer's
accommodation "remove the conflict between employment requirements and the religious
observance or practice of the employee").
183 Although the Establishment Clause question was touched upon briefly by the Court in
discussing the de minimis spending limit in Trans World Airlines, see supra note 152 and ac-
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quirement to provide the most helpful accommodation that did not present
the employer with "undue hardship." So long as the accommodation did not
burden other constituencies, the mandatory offer of an accommodation
would not even raise Establishment Clause concerns.184 The Court de-
clined, however, to impose this duty on employers. Now, the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act seeks to impose that duty. This Comment's pro-
posal would adopt similar language to ensure that accommodations actually
accommodate the students.185  Thus, taken primarily from the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act, this Comment's proposal would include the fol-
lowing provision:
For purposes of determining whether a college, school, or university has vio-
lated section _ [the substantive section] of this Act by failing to provide a rea-
sonable accommodation to the religious observance, practice, or belief of a
student, an accommodation by the college, school, or university shall not be
deemed to be reasonable if such accommodation does not remove the conflict
between the college's, school's, or university's requirements and the religious
observance, practice, or belief of the student.
CONCLUSION
Because most private colleges and universities are not state actors, their
students do not receive the same protection of the First Amendment that
state university students do-the accommodation of religious requests. Un-
protected by the Constitution and largely unaided by the civil rights statutes,
religious students are left without legal recourse in the face of an intolerant
private school administration. This need not be so. This Comment has
shown that a statute may be drafted that provides students with protection,
while not violating the Establishment Clause. The requirement of religious
accommodation for students is appropriate, given the government's active
role in preventing discrimination in education, as well as Congress's recent
and continuing attempts to provide more, not less, religious accommodation.
Thus, this Comment proposes that Congress pass legislation, drawing from
companying text, there was no mention at all of any potential conflict with the First Amend-
ment in Ansonia.
184 See supra Part I1I.B.2 (discussing the issue of burdening nonreligious constituencies).
185 It is worthy to reiterate that the effectiveness of this proposed statute, however, will
remain somewhat subject to the possibility that a court would impose a de minimis expense
limit in order to avoid conflict with the First Amendment, as discussed supra Part IV.B.2.
What the definition of "reasonable accommodation" does accomplish, however, is that if a
university can provide an accommodation consistent with the Establishment Clause, then it
may not turn to statutory interpretation to free itself of its obligation, as the employer did in
Ansonia.
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the models of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, guarantee-
ing private university students reasonable religious accommodations.
